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INTRODUCTION

Many people find themselves following a strict daily routine
that can be severely disrupted if they miss something as minor as
their morning coffee. For such people, jury duty presents a major
challenge. The court system disrupts many Americans’ routines
across the nation on a daily basis, forcing them to miss work, find
alternate daycare, and make alternate plans to transport children
to after-school activities. The trial itself presents unusual tasks that
few people undertake on a daily basis, such as remembering large
amounts of testimony from experts in an unfamiliar field. To
illustrate, consider the case of Linda Johnson. After dropping off
her children at school, Linda would normally head straight to the
office for an eight-hour day of work, but instead she must go to the
courthouse because she has been summoned for jury duty. After
the voir dire process, she is selected to sit on the jury, and she
happily complies to fulfill her civic duty. She listens carefully to the
opening statements and the witnesses’ testimonies, but she begins
to feel uncomfortable as the expert witness discusses an unfamiliar
topic. Linda becomes stressed as the witness is being crossexamined because she is having trouble understanding what the
expert is saying. A simple definition is all she needs, but she has no
opportunity to ask. Linda’s experience is an example of stress that
jurors can feel because they are not allowed to ask questions during
trial. This article discusses the controversy surrounding the
practice of allowing jurors to ask such questions.
Jury duty is an experience that a majority of Americans face at
1
least once in their lifetime. Most do not find jury service to be a
2
burden, despite the popular notion of “getting out of jury duty.”
In fact, eighty-four percent of adults polled believe jury service is a
3
civic duty to be fulfilled despite its possible inconvenience.
Furthermore, adults called for jury duty have a more positive
attitude towards the experience than those who have never been
4
called. Despite these positive statistics, jurors often experience a
5
variety of stressful events as a result of jury duty.
1. AM. BAR ASS’N, JURY SERVICE: IS FULFILLING YOUR CIVIC DUTY A TRIAL? 6
(2004), http://www.abanews.org/releases/juryreport.pdf.
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 6.
5. For a review, see Stanley M. Kaplan & Carolyn Winget, The Occupational
Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 325, 327-28 (1992)
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In order to encourage jurors to fulfill the constitutional role
set out by the Sixth Amendment, courts should provide the jurors
with the best experience possible, including finding ways to limit
6
7
juror stress. Thirty states have begun testing and implementing
jury innovations to improve the jurors’ experiences and aid them in
8
being better fact-finders.
This article will focus on the
9
controversial jury innovation of allowing jurors to ask questions to
witnesses during trial. Such a practice could have many benefits,
including aiding in jurors’ comprehension of evidence and
10
promoting overall satisfaction with the process.
On the other
hand, the practice could negatively impact the adversarial process
11
in a variety of ways.
In Part II, this paper will discuss the psychological “Story
Model” of juror decision-making. This model theorizes that jurors
actively participate in trial by constructing stories that help them
12
understand complex evidence.
This psychological research
supports the need for jury innovations, especially the practice of
allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses. Next, Part III will
provide an overview of juror questioning and examine various
reasons why judges hesitate to allow this innovation. Then, Part IV
will examine the benefits and criticisms that have been supported
through empirical studies. Part V follows with a discussion of
apparent misconceptions among the supporters and critics, and
Part VI will present court decisions that support and discourage the
practice. Part VII provides the recommendation that courts should
uniformly adopt the practice of allowing jurors to ask questions.
This article concludes that, because there are few adverse effects in
(discussing the discomforting physical and physiological symptoms experienced by
jurors); Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Juror Stress: Causes and Interventions,
30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 237 (2004) (outlining various sources of juror stress).
6. See generally Miller & Bornstein, supra note 5.
7. Gregory E. Mize & Christopher J. Connelly, Jury Trial Innovations: Charting
a Rising Tide, 41 CT. REV. 4, 5 (2004).
8. Id.
9. B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating
Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1253 (1993) (listing ten techniques
and procedures to enhance juror participation and comprehension); B. Michael
Dann & Valerie P. Hans, Recent Evaluative Research on Jury Trial Innovations, 41 CT.
REV. 12 (2004); Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial
Ideal, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 90 (2002) (noting increasing support for a
participatory approach to decision-making).
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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allowing juror questioning, the practice should be implemented.
This practice will increase jurors’ satisfaction with the jury
experience and help jurors become better decision-makers.
II. THE ACTIVE JURY CREATES A STORY
In its idealistic form, the adversarial system requires the
decision-maker to remain passive and neutral by waiting until after
13
the closing arguments to make any decisions. This system differs
from the inquisitorial system that is used in many European
14
The inquisitorial system is an alternative to the
countries.
adversarial system that allows the decision-maker to play an active
role in uncovering evidence, including the questioning of
15
witnesses.
While jurors in the adversarial system cannot actively
participate, legal rulings have concluded that judges are allowed to
play an active role and question witnesses, both when the judge is
16
the decision-maker and when a jury is the decision-maker. This
apparent inequity poses the question: If the judge is allowed to play
an active role and ask questions of witnesses, then should jurors be
allowed to do the same when they are the decision-makers in the
case? The answer to this question differs depending on who is
17
being asked, and has created quite a controversy.
For the purpose of this section, the issue will be viewed from a
psychological standpoint. A well-known psychological theory of
decision-making, called the “Story Model,” explains that jurors
18
rarely wait until the end of the trial to come to conclusions.
Instead, they are cognitively active throughout the trial. Such
research suggests that jurors should be allowed to ask questions in
order to facilitate their natural decision-making tendencies.

13. Hans, supra note 9, at 87.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 88.
17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Jurors’
Unanswered Questions, 41 CT. REV. 20 (2004).
18. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models:
The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246 (1981) [hereinafter Pennington &
Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models] (reviewing decision-making models that have
been applied to jurors); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in
Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986)
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation] (discussing the role of
representation of evidence in juror’s decision-making).
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Psychologists Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie propose that
jurors organize trial evidence into a narrative story based on
19
intentions and causation of events. The Story Model suggests that
jurors construct mental accounts of the trial to comprehend
evidence. This story allows the juror to better understand the
20
evidence and reach a verdict decision. Through empirical studies,
21
the authors discovered support for their model and its three
components: construction of a story, establishing verdict categories,
22
and classifying the story into the best fit verdict category.
In one study, participants were randomly selected from a
Massachusetts jury pool to view a videotaped trial, and each was
23
instructed to reach a decision as a juror. Participants were then
interviewed to discuss their decision-making processes and their
24
Interviews uncovered that
recall of verdict definitions.
participants did not organize evidence as a list, but instead
organized evidence by arranging events into causes and effects,
which facilitated the creation of a sensible story that best explains
the evidence presented. Jurors also surmised missing pieces, while
25
disregarding information that did not fit their stories. Next, after
hearing all of the evidence, participants constructed stories about
the relevant verdict categories (e.g., first-degree murder,
26
manslaughter). Simply put, jurors create a mental image of what
each verdict category means to them. Finally, jurors decide which
verdict category is most suitable for the story they have created.
This finding implies that jurors create and shape stories as a means
to answer the legal questions bestowed upon them.
Pennington and Hastie performed another series of
27
experiments that further supported the Story Model.
In these
experiments, participants read shortened trial transcripts and were
asked the direction and probability of their judgment about the

19. Pennington & Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models, supra note 18, at 25253; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18, at 243.
20. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18, at 243.
21. Id. at 242-43; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence:
Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
189 (1992) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence].
22. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18, at 242.
23. Id. at 246.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 252.
26. Id. at 252-53.
27. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 21, at 189.
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case.
Different versions of case facts were manipulated that
30
would affect the ease of constructing a story. The research found
that participants’ evaluations of evidence strength, witness
credibility, and confidence judgments are all affected by the ease in
31
which they can construct stories. This means that jurors make
32
stronger, more confident decisions when the evidence is
presented in the order of a story as opposed to the order that
33
The authors conclude that a
evidence is presented at trial.
“narrative story sequence is the most effective ‘order of proof’ at
34
trial.” While trial judges instruct jurors to refrain from making a
judgment until all evidence has been presented, these studies
suggest that jurors’ natural decision-making processes do not allow
35
them to do so. This line of research also suggests that jurors often
have “holes” in their stories, which could be filled by asking
questions of witnesses. Answers could help jurors create more
accurate stories, leading to better judgments.
In sum, the Story Model provides theoretical explanations of
36
how jurors actively process information throughout trial.
The
Honorable B. Michael Dann, the judge responsible for the leading
jury innovations in Arizona, acknowledges that jurors actively
process information based on a similar Behavioral-Educational
37
Model, even though they are instructed to make decisions in
28.

Id. at 193-94 (Experiment 1), 197-98 (Experiment 2), 201 (Experiment

3).
29. Ratings for the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt varied based on the
various experimental conditions.
30. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 21, at 193-94
(Experiment 1 manipulated order of presenting evidence and credibility of a
witness), 197-98 (Experiment 2 manipulated the completeness of the story to infer
either guilt or innocence and the aggregation level for making judgments, in
which participants were to assess evidence strength by making either a single
“global” judgment after reading all the evidence, “item-by-item” judgments after
each piece of evidence was presented on all the evidence given to that point, or
“local” judgments on blocks of evidence considered separately), 201 (Experiment
3 manipulated aggregation level on a new case, using only “global” and “item-byitem” judgments).
31. Id. at 194-96, 202.
32. The jurors’ decisions are stronger in the preponderance of the evidence
direction. Id. at 202.
33. Id. at 194-95.
34. Id. at 203.
35. Id.
36. See generally Pennington & Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models, supra note
18; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18; Pennington & Hastie,
Explaining the Evidence, supra note 21, at 189.
37. The Behavioral-Educational Model is based on systematic research
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38

accordance with the adversarial Legal Model.
Judge Dann
39
advocates the use of educational techniques to assist jurors in
40
making fair and accurate decisions.
Allowing jurors to ask
questions of witnesses is just one of the many jury innovations that
Judge Dann recommends and has implemented in his Arizona
41
courtroom.
Other states are recognizing that jurors are actively
participating, and that allowing them to ask questions is
42
43
important.
Some court decisions
and jury innovation
44
committees are recommending the practice due to the realized
benefits. Thus, this line of psychological research has found its way
into courtrooms across the country.
III. JUROR QUESTIONING: WHY ALL THE CONTROVERSY?
The surge of jury innovation research has convinced many
45
federal and state courts, as well as the American Bar Association
46
(ABA), to allow jurors to ask questions of witnesses. The ABA has
developed standards for juror questioning which include
47
cautionary instructions and procedures and added commentary
findings, including the “Story Model,” as well as other psychological and
educational studies. For an overview of the research contributing to this model,
see Dann, supra note 9, at 1241-46.
38. The Legal Model is the longstanding model used by the courts, which is
based on the ideal expectations of the adversarial system and assumes that jurors
are passive. For a description of the Legal Model, see id. at 1239-40. For a
comparative summary of the Legal Model and the Behavioral-Educational Model,
see id. at 1246.
39. The main technique is interaction (to “evoke questions, focus attention,
motivate students, assist recall, and allow students to benefit from the exposure to
others’ views”), specifically student-initiated interaction (to provide and elicit
information, as well as provide teachers with direction). Id. at 1245. The other
technique used by educators is the “democratic classroom,” which balances
control and students’ “speaking rights.” Id. at 1245-46. For a deeper look into
these educational techniques, see id. at 1244-46.
40. Id. at 1230, 1246.
41. Id. at 1253-55.
42. See infra Part VI.A.
43. See infra notes 227-32.
44. See infra notes 241-43.
45. See infra Part VI.A. For a list of states’ rules on juror questioning, see
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JURISDICTION-BY-JURISDICTION RULES FOR JUROR
QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES (2004), http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_improvements_
questions_laws.asp.
46. AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARD PART ONE: THE JURY,
STANDARD 4 at 6, 8 (1998).
47. Id. at 6-7.
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48

about the practice.
The ABA Standards indicate that juror
questioning may be neither necessary nor appropriate in many
cases, but the opportunity should be available if the need does
49
arise. Although the role of questioning of witnesses is reserved for
the attorneys, juror questioning may provide clarification of
complicated or unclear testimony during the juror’s quest for
50
truth.
If juror questioning is going to be permitted, the trial judge
reads the instructions to the jury regarding the practice. The ABA
Standards indicate that the purpose of questioning is only to clarify
testimony, thus jurors cannot express opinions through the
questions or argue with witnesses.
Additionally, jurors are
reminded that their role is one of a neutral fact finder, not an
51
advocate for either party to the case. Jurors are also instructed
that their own questions are not to be given more weight than
52
other evidence in the case. Furthermore, the judge informs the
jury that some questions may not be answered due to legal reasons,
such as the rules of evidence, or because the question will probably
53
be answered later in the case. The judge instructs the jury that no
inference is to be drawn if a question is not asked, and that it is not
54
a reflection on the juror or the question.
A. Positive Opinions of Juror Questioning
55

56

Many judges and attorneys favor the practice of allowing
jurors to ask questions of witnesses. The Committee on Juries of
the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit looked at twenty-six

48. Id. at 8-10.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 6-7.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Leonard B. Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted
by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 446 (1985). See
generally Colin F. Campbell & Bob James, Innovations in Jury Management from a
Trial Court’s Perspective, 43 NO. 4 JUDGE’S J. 22, 26 (2004); John R. Stegner, Why I Let
Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 541 (2004); John P. Wesley,
Jury Trial Innovations: Daring to Improve What We Are Sworn to Reserve, 30 VT. BAR J. &
L. DIG. 17 (2004).
56. J. Donald Cowan, Jr., Thomas M. Crisham, Michael B. Keating, Gael
Mahony, Debra E. Pole, Michael A. Pope, William W. Schwarzer & John R. Wester,
What Attorneys Think of Jury Trial Innovations, 86 JUDICATURE 192, 194 (2003).
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trials, involving New York and Vermont federal district courts.
Four of the six judges who participated found the procedure to be
beneficial, particularly in keeping the jury focused on important
issues and helping the jury stay alert by allowing them to feel more
58
involved in the proceedings. Another study of judges’ attitudes
toward jury innovations also found general support for juror
59
questioning.
Sixty percent of the Washington judges surveyed
believed that permitting jurors to ask questions would improve the
60
jury system.
Additionally, Judge John R. Stegner argues that finding the
61
truth is the main purpose of the trial and that this goal is
62
weakened when attorneys hold back and twist evidence.
Therefore, jurors should be allowed to ask questions to sort out or
63
clarify complex and ambiguous evidence. Since judges are given
64
this opportunity, jurors should also have the same privilege.
Speaking anecdotally from his experiences, Judge Stegner has
never seen an instance where a juror’s question sought to
investigate a new aspect of the crime that was not already
65
established by the attorneys.
He also reports that juror
questioning alerts attorneys to issues that must be developed
66
further. In addition, jurors are appreciative of being allowed to
67
Judge Stegner also acknowledges that juror
ask questions.
68
questioning extends the trial length, which is a major concern of
69
the critics. Nevertheless, he still allows the practice and goes so
far as to reject objections on the grounds of “needless consumption
70
When a juror asks a question that has already been
of time.”
addressed or that extends past the range of the earlier questioning,
the attorneys have a legitimate objection based on time
57. Sand & Reiss, supra note 55, at 443.
58. Id. at 446.
59. David C. Brody & John Neiswender, Judicial Attitudes towards Jury Reform,
83 JUDICATURE 298, 299 (2000).
60. Id. at 301.
61. Stegner, supra note 55, at 545-46.
62. Id. at 546.
63. Id. at 546-47.
64. Id. at 547.
65. Id. at 545.
66. Id. at 549.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 550.
69. See N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in Trials, 40 IDAHO
L. REV. 553, 568 (2004).
70. Stegner, supra note 55, at 550.
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71

consumption. However, Judge Stegner does not view answering
the question again as an unnecessary waste of time because he finds
it more important to be sure that the juror hears and understands
72
the evidence. He believes that more questions result in a better
outcome because jurors have more information and can analyze it
73
more thoroughly.
A poll conducted by the American College of Trial Lawyers
found a general support for juror questioning among attorneys as
74
well.
Seventy-nine percent of the attorneys polled believe that
allowing jurors to ask questions improves juror comprehension of
75
the evidence. Additionally, ninety-three percent of the attorneys
76
believe that the practice increases juror satisfaction with the trial.
About one-half of respondents also view the practice as enhancing
77
the quality of justice.
B. Negative Opinions of Juror Questioning
Although there has been much approval for allowing jurors to
78
79
ask questions, not all attorneys and judges support the practice.
One of the primary reasons appears to be the possible threat to the
80
principles underlying the adversary system. The adversary system
calls for a neutral jury that remains an unbiased and objective fact81
By allowing jurors to perform a role not intended for
finder.
them under the adversary system, critics believe that the juror’s role
82
becomes radically different.
This leaves open the question of
what the juror’s role currently is and what it should be.

71. Id. at 550-51.
72. Id. at 551.
73. Id.
74. Cowan et al., supra note 56, at 194.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See generally Smith, supra note 69.
80. See Robert Augustus Harper & Michael Robert Ufferman, Jury Questions in
Criminal Cases: Neutral Arbiters or Active Interrogators?, 78 FLA. B.J. 8, 13 (2004);
Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is the
Question,” 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2003); Smith, supra note 69, at 563-64.
81. Smith, supra note 69, at 562; Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 13.
82. See Smith, supra note 69, at 563-64.
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Judges’ Concerns

Judge Dann believes that there are many reasons for the
83
controversy over juror questioning. One major concern is that
allowing jurors to question witnesses significantly alters the roles of
84
attorneys and the judge.
In particular, allowing juries to
participate in the trial threatens the advocates’ control of their case
85
and the judge’s control of the trial.
Another primary criticism is that jurors’ questions will help
prosecutors and plaintiffs meet their required burden of proof by
86
bringing out evidence that will strengthen one party’s arguments.
For example, jurors may ask questions that indicate that there are
holes in the prosecutor’s story, giving the prosecutor a second
chance to prove the case. This could be seen as an unfair
advantage for the prosecutor. If this happens, it compromises the
legal system’s premise that if a party cannot meet the burden of
87
proof, then that party should not win the case.
In such an
instance, the prosecutor is given an unfair advantage. Because the
goal of finding the truth must not trump the defendant’s
88
constitutional right of a fair trial by jury, some critics suggest that
jury questioning is too risky.
Additionally, despite the Second Circuit’s generally positive
89
findings for juror questioning, two judges in the study said they
90
did not intend to permit the practice in the future. One of these
two judges found the questioning to be disruptive and believed that
91
counsel should be the only ones allowed to question witnesses.
This judge said that if jurors need crucial information, then they
will ask the court for it, without needing special procedures to ask
92
questions. The other judge expressed his belief that if jurors ask
questions, then they probably have preconceptions that are not
93
likely to be changed.
While voir dire is intended to act as a
safeguard to prevent jurors with such inflexible preconceptions
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Dann, supra note 9, at 1253.
Id.
Id.
See Smith, supra note 69, at 567.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 567; see also Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 13.
See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Sand & Reiss, supra note 55, at 444.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id. at 444.
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from sitting on the jury, typical voir dire is seldom effective in
94
detecting this bias. Thus, biased jurors do manage to find their
way on the jury. These jurors could, as the judge notes, use
95
questioning as a technique to further his or her own agenda.
However, this judge’s concerns are not supported by research,
which has revealed that questions asked by the jurors appear to
focus more on clarifying evidence rather than choosing a side and
96
interrogating witnesses.
G. Thomas Munsterman, a leading researcher in jury
innovations, suggests an alternative explanation for the debate over
97
juror questioning. He argues that judges are more hesitant to
allow this jury innovation as compared to most other innovations
because of the continued vigilance of the judge that is required
98
over this ongoing process. Unlike other jury innovations, juror
questioning is one of the few that requires attention throughout
99
the entire practice. For example, jury note-taking only requires
100
However,
one decision: whether or not to allow the practice.
juror questioning involves numerous procedures and the judge
needs to make many more decisions in addition to the initial
101
decision to allow the practice. Therefore, the practice lengthens
102
the trial,
which some argue is “a needless consumption of
103
time.” Another potential concern may be that making numerous
decisions about the practice allows for many more chances for
appeals because every one of these decisions is under scrutiny.
Munsterman proposes that many judges feel uncomfortable
104
making decisions about whether to allow a question. The judges
face a greater complexity with this innovation as compared to
94. Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks?
Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1179,
1182 (2003).
95. Sand & Reiss, supra note 55, at 444.
96. Mott, supra note 80, at 1119.
97. Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Dir. of the Ctr. for Jury Studies,
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Dec. 7, 2004).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 46, at 5.
101. Id. at 6-7.
102. Stegner, supra note 55, at 551.
103. Smith, supra note 69, at 568. This comment is based on Rule 611(a) of
the Idaho Rules of Evidence, which states that courts must “avoid needless
consumption of time.” IDAHO R. EVID. 611(a).
104. Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Dir. of the Ctr. for Jury Studies,
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Dec. 7, 2004).
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others because of the potential ramifications (e.g., jurors drawing
105
Different judges have
inferences from unasked questions).
varying thresholds for admittance standards, in which some follow
the most lenient standard possible, while others employ a stricter
106
standard.
Judges who use the lenient standard simply ask the
attorneys if they accept the question, and if neither attorney
107
objects, then the judge will ask the question.
Juror questioning
gives the judge a greater challenge than any other innovation, but
the solution to the challenge may come with more training,
108
particularly over the threshold for admitting questions.
In
addition, after a determination is made that a question can be
asked, a new decision must be made of whether an attorney or the
109
judge asks the question. With a lack of training on how to handle
juror questioning, it is no surprise that many judges are skeptical of
allowing the practice.
2.

Attorneys’ Concerns

While the American College of Trial Lawyers poll uncovered
110
that attorneys generally support juror questioning,
many
111
Some attorneys fear
attorneys are still skeptical of the practice.
jurors will abuse the opportunity by becoming competitive against
attorneys or other jurors, or that jurors may ask questions simply
112
because they can. In addition, one-third of the attorneys feel that
113
the practice diminishes the quality of justice.
Another criticism of juror questioning is that it gives the
114
If
prosecutor a “second chance to make his case” to the jurors.
jurors see a gap in the prosecution’s theory, they may ask for
115
further clarification, and then the prosecutor can fill in the gap.
116
117
Therefore, attorneys have the same fear as judges about jurors
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 46, at 7.
110. Cowan et al., supra note 56, at 194.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Richard Willing, Courts Try to Make Jury Duty Less of a Chore, USA TODAY,
Mar. 17, 2005, at 17A.
115. Id.
116. Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 13.
117. Smith, supra note 69, at 567; see also text accompanying notes 86-88.
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helping meet the burden of proof. Additionally, critics believe that
defense attorneys would need to abandon their role of fervently
representing the defendant by asking jurors’ questions that may be
118
unfavorable to their side.
In sum, some judges and attorneys fear the consequences of
allowing jurors to question witnesses. The main concerns stem
from the potential threat to the adversarial system, in which jurors’
roles may be transformed from neutral fact-finders to biased
advocates. Furthermore, the defendant’s constitutional rights may
be infringed upon if the prosecution is given another chance to
meet the burden of proof. Also, judges and attorneys may feel that
they lose control over the case. Other concerns include the
additional trial time necessary in implementing the practice and
the lack of knowledge on the part of judges in making decisions
about the admissibility of certain questions.
IV. THE VERDICT IS IN: BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS THAT HOLD UP IN
EMPIRICAL COURT
A. The Benefits
Psychological research has demonstrated many benefits of
allowing jurors to ask questions to witnesses, such as assisting with
119
For
comprehension of evidence and reducing stress of trial.
instance, Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod conducted two studies on
trial complexity and how jury reforms would help jurors better
120
comprehend the evidence and the law.
Their national study
118. Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 12.
119. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of
Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994) [hereinafter Heuer &
Penrod, Trial Complexity]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror
Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256
(1996) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation]; Larry Heuer &
Steven Penrod, Jury Decision-Making in Complex Trials, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN
LEGAL CONTEXTS (D. Carson & R. Bull eds., 1995) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod,
Complex Trials]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in
Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 231 (1988) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A
Field Experiment]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking
During Trials: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994)
[hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials].
120. See Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod,
Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Complex Trials, supra
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
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consisted of 160 state and federal trials in thirty-three states,
seventy-five of which were civil cases and eighty-five were criminal
122
cases.
Their other study consisted of sixty-seven Wisconsin state
trials, thirty-four of which were civil cases and thirty-three were
123
criminal cases. The authors drew many conclusions that respond
to advocates’ claims of advantages and critics’ claims of
124
disadvantages.
The authors conclude that juror questioning is beneficial in
125
that it advances juror understanding of the case issues and facts.
In addition, the process reduces juror doubts about evidence
126
The jurors allowed to ask questions in the
presented at trial.
Wisconsin study were more satisfied with the questioning of the
witness, and more often said there was sufficient information to
127
reach a reliable verdict.
In the national study, juror questions
were the most helpful when evidence and legal information were
128
most complex. As evidence became more complex, jurors in the
non-questioning condition were less confident that they reached
the right verdict, as compared to those in the question-asking
129
condition.
The authors determined that jurors asked questions
130
primarily to help clarify complicated testimony or legal issues.
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119.
121. Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119, at 122; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at
256-57.
122. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 258;
Heuer & Penrod, Trial complexity, supra note 119, at 29; Heuer & Penrod, Complex
Trials, supra note 119, at 534.
123. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 258;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 231.
124. See Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod,
Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Complex Trials, supra
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119.
125. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 142; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 252.
126. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260.
127. Id.; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment,
supra note 119, at 252.
128. Heuer & Penrod, Complex Trials, supra note 119, at 537.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Allowing jurors to question witnesses also reduced the harms (e.g.,
weaker verdict confidence, and finding the defense attorney less
131
helpful)
that often result when attorneys present complex
132
information.
Judge Dann and psychologist Valerie P. Hans conducted an
experiment using a mock jury to study questions jurors would ask
133
to a DNA expert witness testifying on technical data.
Their
research uncovered extremely high support (97%) for juror
134
questioning in the conditions that allowed the practice.
In
addition, 75% of mock jurors in the question-asking conditions said
that the practice aided them in better comprehending the
135
evidence.
However, testing of comprehension levels found no
136
indicating that the practice increased
statistical differences,
subjective perceptions of understanding but did not increase actual
understanding of the evidence.
Furthermore, jurors often expressed their desire to ask
137
questions when they were unable to do so at trial. A Philadelphia
study showed that 80% of jurors wanted to question witnesses, and
49.5% said that at the end of the case, they still had questions that
138
they wanted answered.
Another study involving post-trial
interviews revealed that jurors remained confused as they entered
the jury box, and one juror wondered why she was not allowed to
139
ask questions. “[Y]ou mean we just have to decide and can’t ask
any more questions? . . . [W]hy do you leave us floundering here,
why don’t you let us ask some questions and give us some
140
answers?”
Research by Monica K. Miller and Brian H. Bornstein provides
support for the use of jury questioning during trials as a means of
141
reducing juror stress.
When asked to identify stressors involved
131. Id. at 536.
132. Id. at 537.
133. Dann & Hans, supra note 9, at 15.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Nicole L. Mott, Valerie P. Hans & Lindsay Simpson, What’s Half a Lung
Worth? Civil Jurors’ Accounts of Their Award Decision Making, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
401, 417 (2000); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury:
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 556 (1997).
138. Smith, supra note 137, at 556.
139. Mott et al., supra note 137, at 417.
140. Id.
141. See generally Miller & Bornstein, supra note 5 (summarizing research on
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in jury service, 21% of respondents reported at least a moderate
stress level (i.e., a 3 or higher on a scale of 1-5) produced by the
142
prohibition of asking questions and taking notes. This study also
revealed that 40% of jurors experienced at least a moderate level of
stress due to “having limited input during trial; not being allowed
143
to ask questions.”
While only 6% of jurors in the study were
permitted to ask questions, 70% said the practice helped them at
144
least moderately in performing their duties. On the other hand,
65% of jurors who were not permitted to ask questions said the
145
practice would have at least moderately helped them.
The National Center for State Courts has suggested that jurors
experience stress when they are unable to actively participate in the
146
trial. If jurors are allowed to ask questions at trial, then they will
147
feel more control over the proceedings, which will increase
148
concentration and make information processing easier.
Furthermore, a bailiff expressed his empathy for jurors not being
149
allowed to ask questions. “I tell new bailiffs to think how it would
feel if you had to sit there and couldn’t ask questions. You have to
150
just sit there listening to other people talk.”
Finally, a Colorado pilot program for testing juror questioning
in the courts found evidence strongly in favor of allowing the
151
innovation. Specifically, surveys of jurors found that 93% believe
152
Furthermore, jurors show
the practice should be permitted.
more positive attitudes towards the trial proceedings when they are
153
allowed to utilize the practice.
Jurors felt they gained more
information and clarification, as well as appearing more attentive
juror stress and the measures available to help alleviate it).
142. Id.; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THROUGH THE EYES OF THE
JUROR:
A
MANUAL
FOR
ADDRESSING
JUROR
STRESS
29
(1998),
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_JurorStressPub.pdf.
143. Miller & Bornstein, supra note 5.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 142, at 29.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id. at 29.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See MARY DODGE, SHOULD JURORS ASK QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES? A
REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT’S JURY SYSTEM COMMITTEE
(2002), http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/juryreformdocs/
dodgereport.pdf.
152. Id. at 47.
153. Id. at 57.
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154

and engaged in the trial.
In addition, judges and attorneys who
experienced the innovation became increasingly supportive of the
155
procedure.
B. The Criticisms
Research has revealed very little data to support the criticisms
of allowing jurors to ask questions. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary
R. Rose, and Beth Murphy were given the unique opportunity to
perform a detailed content analysis on jurors’ discussions both
during deliberations and any conversations that occurred in the
156
These interactions were videotaped as part of the
jury room.
157
Arizona Filming Project, in which fifty civil trials were sampled in
158
Jurors asked 820 questions throughout these
the experiment.
trials, and over three-quarters (76%) of the questions were allowed
159
by the judges.
Overall, the findings of this study support the
160
practice of jurors questioning witnesses, particularly because most
of the questions refused by the judge resulted in no reaction from
161
the jurors.
However, some questions did cause some
162
Seven questions
conversations that critics would deem harmful.
(4%) ignited some mild complaints over the judge’s refusal to ask
the question, such as expressing shock or arguing that the question
163
was relevant.
In addition, there were thirty-one questions (16%)
that the jurors tried to answer themselves after the judge refused to
ask the question, implying that the question was inappropriate or
164
irrelevant and should not be used in evaluating the case.
The
jurors drew inferences from direct testimony when attempting to
165
answer twelve of those questions.
The other questions were
answered using the jurors’ own experiences, beliefs, and
166
expertise.
However, these questions were discussed as jurors

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 17, at 21-22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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would normally talk about the issues if a question was not posed on
167
the topic.
This study also found only one instance where a juror drew
conclusions from the sole fact that the judge refused to answer the
168
question.
In this instance, the juror was interested in knowing if
the plaintiff’s car had a specific design feature, and inferred from
the judge’s failure to answer the question, “I got no answer, so
169
evidently it’s not [part of the design].”
However, a brief
explanation as to why the question will not be asked serves as a
simple safeguard that can be implemented to actually prevent such
170
assumptions.
The study found that no such inferences were
drawn in any case when the judge gave even a small
171
acknowledgment as to why the question was not asked.
If the
judge in this case would have mentioned that the question could
not be answered simply because it is not relevant in making a
decision, then the juror may not have drawn the conclusion that he
did. Therefore, only one question out of 820 caused a major
problem, which probably would not have resulted if the proper
172
safeguards were in place.
In sum, empirical research has supported many benefits and
few criticisms of allowing jurors to ask questions. First, jurors were
more satisfied with the questioning of witnesses when they had the
ability to ask questions. Second, jurors were more confident in
their understanding of the evidence and felt the evidence was
clarified and sufficient for reaching a reliable verdict. Next, jurors
wanted to ask questions and they became more attentive and
engaged in the trial when they were given the opportunity.
Furthermore, the practice reduced juror stress caused by the jury
experience.
Conversely, empirical studies also uncovered criticisms for
allowing jurors to ask questions. For instance, jurors sometimes
mildly complained when their questions were not answered and
occasionally attempted to answer the questions themselves.
Although very rare, jurors also drew conclusions from an
unanswered question.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
See id. at 27.
Id. at 26, 28 n.48.
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V. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS: BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS THAT
REMAIN UNSUPPORTED
A. Not-So-Beneficial Benefits
While some benefits are explained above as being supported
empirically, there are other benefits listed by supporters that were
not confirmed by psychological research.
Advocates for juror questioning claim that one benefit of the
173
practice is that it would help jurors get to the truth.
However,
the research discussed earlier by Heuer and Penrod demonstrated
that this benefit does not actually occur, just as judges and lawyers
174
in both studies had expected.
Another suggested benefit of juror questions is that they alert
175
attorneys to specific issues that need to be developed further. In
both studies conducted by Heuer and Penrod, the judges and
lawyers expected juror questions to be helpful in pinpointing juror
176
confusion about the law or evidence, but they agreed after the
177
trial that that benefit was not realized.
Juror questioning also did not increase juror, attorney, and
178
judge satisfaction over the verdict. Jurors appeared to be satisfied
with the trial procedure, no matter which condition they were in
during the trial, and their opinions did not differ much between

173. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 237; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During
Trials, supra note 119, at 125.
174. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 252-53; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119, at 143.
175. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 237; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During
Trials, supra note 119, at 125.
176. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 254.
177. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 254; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119, at 143.
178. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 253; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119, at 144.
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their verdicts or their attitudes toward jury service. Both judges
and lawyers were also reasonably satisfied, judges somewhat more
181
than lawyers, finding little difference between the conditions.
B. Criticizing the Criticisms
While some criticisms of juror questioning were uncovered
through psychological studies, there were also many criticisms
rejected by empirical research. One of the main criticisms of juror
182
questioning is its posed threat to the adversary system; however,
183
Nicole Mott
this criticism did not stand up to empirical testing.
performed a content analysis on 2271 questions asked by jurors in
184
real trials. She found that jurors’ questions pose no real threat to
the adversary system, and instead the questions are used to advance
185
their role as neutral decision-makers. Jurors’ questions were used
to clarify testimony and they did not attempt to uncover new
186
Mott concludes that if
evidence or cross-examine witnesses.
jurors are supposed to seek truth in the facts, they need to
comprehend the facts so as to not make uninformed decisions or
187
possibly hang the jury.
The Heuer and Penrod studies found similar results by
examining whether jurors can remain neutral (i.e., not become
188
advocates) when they are allowed to ask questions. This concern
is indirectly addressed by the pattern of jury decisions, which
indicated that the verdicts were not significantly affected by
189
whether or not the juries were allowed to ask questions.
The
179. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 253; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra
note 119, at 144.
180. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260.
181. Id.
182. Mott, supra note 80, at 1099.
183. Id. at 1119.
184. Id. at 1111.
185. Id. at 1119. Some examples of questions given are: “Please clarify who is
allowed to contact who[m] during the order of protection.”; “Did you see blood
anywhere else other than the knife?”; “What type of door locks were on the entry
door? And how old is the door and lock?” Id. at 1117.
186. Id. at 1119.
187. Id.
188. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 146.
189. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
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practice did not affect judge-jury agreement rates and did not
give the jury a less favorable impression of either attorney, which
191
would be assumed if they lost sight of neutrality.
Instead, both
attorneys were viewed somewhat more favorably when jurors were
192
allowed to ask questions.
Additionally, attorneys in the Heuer and Penrod national
study did not expect questions to cause prejudice to their clients or
193
to undermine the adversarial process goals.
After the trial, the
lawyers and judges were confident that those problems did not
194
arise.
This evidence suggests that critics’ concerns about the
negative outcomes of allowing jurors to ask questions could be
unfounded.
Another concern with juror questioning is that jurors will
attempt to uncover information intentionally left out by the
195
attorney.
In Heuer and Penrod’s Wisconsin study, lawyers were
asked if the jurors raised information that they had deliberately left
196
Therefore,
out, but the attorneys said that was not a problem.
juror questioning did not appear to interrupt the attorneys’ trial
197
strategies.
Even though jurors do not know the rules of evidence, they
198
still did not ask inappropriate questions. In the Wisconsin study,
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 146.
190. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 146.
191. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261.
192. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 146-47.
193. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 148.
194. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 148.
195. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 255.
196. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260.
197. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 255.
198. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 144-45.
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judges and lawyers did not expect their questions to be
199
The same
inappropriate and they did not believe they were.
200
responses occurred for the judges in the national study. Lawyers
in the national study were originally more skeptical of the
questions, but in the end they did not find the questions asked to
201
be harmful or irrelevant. Furthermore, the Diamond et al. study
found absolutely no instances within the 820 questions of jurors
202
asking frivolous questions.
In addition, jurors do not give more weight to their own
203
questions over the other evidence presented at trial. Jurors in the
questioning condition were quite modest when evaluating the
204
helpfulness of the answers to their questions.
In addition,
discussing answers to jurors’ questions was only 10% of deliberation
205
time, an average of fifteen minutes.
Despite the critics’ beliefs, attorneys will object to
inappropriate juror questions without reluctance, as shown in both
206
Heuer and Penrod studies.
In the national study, 20% of
207
questions were objected to, and 17% were in the Wisconsin
208
Lawyers in the national study objected to at least one
study.
199. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260.
200. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145.
201. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145.
202. Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 17, at 27.
203. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 147.
204. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 147.
205. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 147-48.
206. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 255-56.
207. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145.
208. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119,
at 255-56.
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question in 40% of the trials in which at least one question was
209
asked. Jurors in both studies responded that they understood the
210
basis for the objection and were not embarrassed or angry.
Similarly, Diamond et al. found that a majority (62%) of the 197
questions disallowed by the judge resulted in no reaction from the
211
jurors.
Furthermore, attorneys were concerned that juror questioning
would unnecessarily slow down the trial, but lawyers in the
212
question-asking trials responded that this was not a problem.
Judges did not believe that the practice would waste too much time,
and judges in the question-asking trials did not find time to be an
213
issue.
Juror questioning also did not seem to affect courtroom
214
decorum.
Heuer and Penrod concluded from their studies that there is
215
not a prejudicial effect in allowing juror questioning. The judgejury agreement rate for the verdicts and the fact that the jurors had
more favorable views of both attorneys when the practice was
216
allowed show that the questions did not cause prejudice. Lawyers
and judges did not see these biasing effects, even though lawyers
217
The judges and attorneys in the
had expected to see them.
Wisconsin study did not seriously object to juror questioning,
viewing it more favorably after participating in a trial with the
218
procedure.
Lawyers did not expect any major benefits and did
219
not find any, but they also did not see any detriment.
In the
209. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145.
210. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 145-46; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 256.
211. See Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 17, at 25.
212. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra
note 119, at 254-55.
213. Id. at 255.
214. Id. at 254-55.
215. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 148.
216. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261;
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119,
at 148.
217. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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national study, judges and attorneys were asked to rate how much
they agree with the statement, “I am in favor of allowing jurors to
220
ask questions of witnesses during the trial.” Judges and lawyers in
the juror-questioning condition were more enthusiastic with the
221
Judges in this condition were essentially undecided
practice.
222
beforehand, and then moderately endorsed the procedure after
223
224
Lawyers were modestly against the procedure
exposure to it.
225
and then became more neutral afterwards.
In sum, some suggested benefits and criticisms of juror
questioning are not supported by empirical research. The practice
does not aid jurors in finding the truth or help attorneys pinpoint
areas that need further development. Juror questioning did not
threaten the adversary system, and instead jurors only asked
questions to clarify testimony that would improve their neutral factfinding role. The practice did not disturb attorney’s strategies or
courtroom decorum.
Furthermore, jurors did not ask
inappropriate or frivolous questions, nor did they give more weight
to their questions than other evidence. Attorneys were not
reluctant to object to questions, and unanswered questions
generally did not elicit any response. Finally, juror questioning did
not unnecessarily lengthen the trial process.
VI. THE CURRENT STATUS OF ALLOWING JURORS TO QUESTION
WITNESSES
The State of Arizona has been the leader of the reform
226
227
effort, becoming the first to allow jurors to ask questions, and
228
Meanwhile, a few
some states are now beginning to follow suit.
229
states have ruled the practice unconstitutional and forbid its use.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See generally Mize & Connelly, supra note 7, at 4-5; Janessa E. Shtabsky,
Comment, A More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the Standard for Reform with its New Jury
Rules?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1009 (1996).
227. Mize & Connelly, supra note 7, at 5.
228. Id. For information on the first national meeting on jury reforms, see
Robert Boatwright & Elissa Krauss, Jury Summit 2001: A Report on the First National
Meeting of the Ever-Growing Community Concerned with Improving the Jury System, 86
JUDICATURE 145 (2002).
229. These states are Minnesota, State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn.
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Other states are reluctant to allow the practice but have ruled that
230
The federal circuits have all ruled that juror
it is constitutional.
231
questioning is constitutional, but most discourage the practice.
A. Jurisdictions Allowing the Practice
Approximately one-third of states have approved the use of
232
juror questioning through either court rulings or state statutes.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court ordered that it is at the trial
judge’s discretion to allow jurors to ask questions by approving
233
Superior Court Rule 64-B. Vermont also ruled that the practice is
234
permissible at the discretion of the trial judge.
Although New
York Judge Kenneth Lange has allowed juror questioning in his
235
courtroom since 1984, it was not until 1994 that the state court
determined that courts should allow juror questioning at the trial
236
court’s discretion.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the benefits of
237
juror questioning in United States v. Callahan, stating,
There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing
occasional questions from jurors to be asked of witnesses.
If a juror seems unclear as to a point in the proof, it
makes good common sense to allow a question to be
asked about it. If nothing else, the question should alert
trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more
238
extensive development.
The Tenth Circuit also ruled that the practice is permissible,

2002); Mississippi, Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985 (Miss. 1998); Nebraska, State
v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1991); and Texas, Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d
882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
230. See, e.g., Landt v. State, 87 P.3d 73 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
231. See infra notes 249-66 and accompanying text.
232. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JURY IMPROVEMENTS: JUROR QUESTIONS TO
WITNESSES (2004), http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_improvements_juror_
questions.asp. For a list of states’ rules on juror questioning, see AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y, JURISDICTION-BY-JURISDICTION RULES FOR JUROR QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES
(2004), http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_improvements_questions_laws.asp#n.
233. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Order 1130 (Nov. 30, 2000), available
at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/orders/ordr1130.htm.
234. State v. Doleszny, 844 A.2d 773 (Vt. 2004).
235. Jonathan Bandler, Practice Becoming More Popular in Courtrooms, THE
JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Feb. 3, 2002, at 1B.
236. People v. Bacic, 608 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (App. Div. 1994).
237. 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
238. Id. at 1086.
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239

following precedent that no federal court has prohibited its use.
In addition, some states implemented pilot projects and
240
produced reports recommending juror questioning.
The results
241
242
243
Colorado,
of the reports influenced Hawaii, New Jersey,
244
245
Washington, and Tennessee to implement procedural rules for
246
allowing the jury innovation. In addition, the Massachusetts and
247
Ohio courts have ruled in favor of the practice after their states’
248
pilot projects, although they used precedent for their reasoning
and do not mention the projects in their decisions.
B. Jurisdictions Allowing the Practice, but Cautious of It
A majority of the federal circuit courts have voiced their
reservations about juror questioning, although they all permit the
239. Willner v. Soares, No. 02-1352, 2003 WL 254327, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 5,
2003).
240. Mize & Connelly, supra note 7, at 5-7.
241. See HAW. R. PENAL P. 26; HAW. R. CIV. P. 47. For more information on the
project and its recommendations, see HAW. COMM. ON JURY INNOVATIONS FOR THE
21ST CENTURY, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT OF THE HAWAII COMMITTEE ON
JURY INNOVATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999); HAW. COMM. ON JURY INNOVATIONS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE HAWAII
COMMITTEE ON JURY INNOVATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999).
242. See N.J. CT. R. 1:8-8. For information on the project and report, see JURY
PILOT SUBCOMM., N.J. JUDICIARY, REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT ALLOWING JUROR
QUESTIONS (2001), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jurypilot/jurypilot.htm.
243. See COLO. R. CTY. CT. CIV. P. 347(u); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24(g). For the
complete report and recommendations on jury reform in Colorado, see COLO.
JURY REFORM IMPLEMENTATION COMM., COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN: JURY REFORM IN COLORADO (1998), http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/
committees/juryreformdocs/98_jury_imp.pdf. For information on the project
and report see, DODGE, supra note 151; Leland P. Anderson & Melinda Taylor, Jury
Reform in the State Court System, 33 COLO. LAW. 39 (2004).
244. See WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 43(k); WASH. CIV. R. CT. LIMITED JURIS. 43(k).
For information on the project and report, see Jeffrey C. Grant, Recent Changes to
Washington’s Jury Trials: A Great System Made Even Better, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 431
(2003).
245. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 43A.03; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 24.1(c). For information on
the pilot project, see Neil P. Cohen, Better, Happier Juries: Tennessee Jury Reform
Respects Jurors’ Time and Provides Them More Resources to Do the Job, 39 TENN. B.J. 16,
17-18, 22 (2003).
246. Commonwealth v. Britto, 744 N.E.2d 1089, 1103-06 (Mass. 2001)
(upholding the ruling allowing the practice and the procedures for its
implementation); Commonwealth v. Urena, 632 N.E.2d 1200 (Mass. 1994). For
information on the project and report, see PAULA HANNAFORD & G. THOMAS
MUNSTERMAN, MASSACHUSETTS PROJECT ON INNOVATIVE JURY TRIAL PRACTICES: FINAL
REPORT (2002).
247. See generally State v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio 2003).
248. Id. at 226-30; Britto, 744 N.E.2d at 1103-06.
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practice. In voicing their disapproval, the First Circuit said in
United States v. Sutton, “juror participation . . . should be the long249
250
odds exception, not the rule.”
In United States v. Ajmal and
251
United States v. Bush, the Second Circuit ruled that the practice is
at the discretion of the trial judge, but they “strongly discourage its
252
253
use.” Additionally, the Sixth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and
254
Eighth Circuit also discourage juror questioning. Furthermore,
the Third Circuit allows the practice after judicial screening of the
questions, but stated, “the dangers of allowing jurors to ask
questions orally far outweighs any perceived benefit of allowing
255
The Fourth Circuit also permits
juror questioning of witnesses.”
juror questioning, but said the practice is “fraught with dangers
256
which can undermine the orderly progress of the trial to verdict.”
The Ninth Circuit allows the procedure, but warns that juror
257
questions “should not be encouraged or solicited.”
This circuit
ruled that the trial court has discretion in implementing the
258
practice and that the trial judge makes no error in permitting the
259
260
procedure.
Since 1994, Ninth Circuit Judge Robert Jones has
allowed jurors to interrupt witnesses on the stand and ask questions
261
The lawyers have a switch under their desks that
in civil trials.
262
they can flip when they want to object to a question.
A button
then lights up under Jones’s bench and he can dismiss the
263
question.
249. United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992).
250. 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995).
251. 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995).
252. United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2000).
253. United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1996).
254. United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1990).
255. United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 1999).
256. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir.
1985).
257. JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, A MANUAL ON JURY TRIAL
PROCEDURES 65 (2004), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/Web/
SDocuments.nsf/a67a78661317c5a58825673200662c8c/$FILE/2004%20manual
.pdf.
258. United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 382 (9th Cir. 1994).
259. United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1970).
260. In the Portland, Oregon court.
261. Associated Press, Jurors Can Interrupt, Ask Questions, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 2,
1999, at A7. This article is summarized and monitored by Roger Knights for the
Global Ideas Bank, available at http://www.globalideasbank.org/site/bank/idea
.php?ideaId=420.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit used precedent in ruling that juror
264
but the court acknowledged the
questioning is permissible,
265
potential dangers discussed in past cases.
Therefore, the court
concluded that the practice is to be considered on a case-by-case
266
basis.
In addition to federal courts, the Alaska Court of Appeals has
267
ruled in Landt v. State that allowing jurors to ask questions at trial
268
Alaska will review the
is not an abuse of judicial discretion.
permissibility on a case-by-case basis to determine if the procedure
269
prejudices the defendant in the particular case.
C. Jurisdictions Forbidding the Practice
While the federal courts have all permitted juror questioning
(even though most caution its use), four states have ruled to
completely forbid the practice. Despite the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
actually approving juror questioning, the Texas Court of Criminal
270
Appeals ruled against the practice in Morrison v. State, stating,
To allow our adversary system to travel, without prior
authorization, unregulated by statute or rule, in the
direction encouraged by the trial court’s practice is
inconsistent with the principles underlying the system.
Further, the dangers inherent in such a practice cannot
be adequately circumvented by the imposition of
271
procedural safeguards.
Along with Texas, the only other states that specifically
272
prohibit jurors from asking questions to witnesses are Mississippi,
273
274
The Mississippi Supreme Court
Nebraska, and Minnesota.
264. United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000).
265. Id. at 1290.
266. Id. at 1291.
267. 87 P.3d 73 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
268. Id. at 74.
269. Id. at 80.
270. Texas is within the Fifth Circuit’s federal jurisdiction.
271. Morrison v. Texas, 845 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
However, Texas does permit the practice in civil cases if the proper procedural
safeguards are in place. Hudson v. Markum, 948 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
272. Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985, 988-90 (Miss. 1998) (prohibiting the
practice in both criminal and civil cases).
273. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Neb. 1991) (prohibiting the practice
in both criminal and civil cases).
274. State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2002) prohibits the practice in
criminal cases. There is currently no state case law about the permissibility of the
practice in civil cases.
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opined that a major problem with the practice is that jurors are
275
The Nebraska Supreme
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.
Court ruled that juror questioning is prohibited because jurors
276
become advocates and may possibly antagonize witnesses.
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that allowing jurors
277
to ask questions threatens the jurors’ role in the adversary system.
In sum, many states acknowledge the benefits of allowing
jurors to ask questions and permit the practice at the discretion of
the trial judge. There are some states that are more cautious in
allowing the procedure and the appellate courts will review the
prejudicial effects of the practice on a case-by-case basis. There are
four states that prohibit juror questioning in criminal cases, and
two that specifically disallow the practice in civil cases as well.
Additionally, there are no federal circuit courts that forbid the
practice, but a majority of them discourage its use.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on the psychological and other empirical evidence
supporting jurors asking questions to witnesses, the authors
conclude that this practice should be allowed during trial.
The Story Model of juror decision-making indicates that jurors
278
are cognitively active decision-makers.
Legal experts such as
Judge Dann have agreed that jurors are not passive decision-makers
and have implemented juror innovations—such as allowing jurors
to ask questions—that help jurors in their tasks. Allowing jurors to
ask questions provides answers that help jurors build accurate
stories and come to better verdicts.
Empirical psychological studies further support the idea that
279
juror questioning can be beneficial
and that the feared
280
Jurors
consequences do not seem to occur frequently.
experience stress due to not being allowed to ask questions and feel
they could have performed their jobs better if they were allowed to
ask questions. This is especially true when the legal issues or
evidence is complex. When allowed to ask, jurors appreciate the
opportunity to ask questions and feel it helps them in their fact275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Wharton, 734 So. 2d at 990.
Zima, 468 N.W.2d at 380.
Costello, 646 N.W.2d at 213.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part V.B.
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finder tasks. Jurors are more confident in their verdicts and more
satisfied with their jury experience when allowed to ask questions.
In addition, court actors get a more favorable view of the
procedure after experiencing it. Other research has indicated that
most jurors do not ask frivolous questions or make improper
inferences when judges refuse to ask the question.
On the other hand, some evidence indicates that actual
comprehension is not enhanced, suggesting that the benefits of
jury questioning are largely subjective. Even if this is the case, it is
still important that allowing jurors to ask questions improves jurors’
experiences in the court system. Jury duty is an essential part of the
justice system. In order to encourage juror participation, courts
should take measures to ensure participation and limit juror noshows.
This includes adopting procedures, such as juror
questioning, which enhance the subjective experience of jury duty.
Making jury duty a better experience encourages participation and
preserves the integrity of the legal system.
Because the wealth of psychological research reveals many
benefits and few ills resulting from allowing jurors to ask questions,
this article recommends that courts uniformly adopt the practice.
It is recommended that jurisdictions follow the standards set forth
by the ABA. Courts should also develop training and education
programs to inform judges about appropriate ways to conduct jury
questioning.
Finally, it is recommended that researchers continue to
investigate the effects of questioning. Many states have started
their own task forces for implementing jury innovations, which is a
step in the right direction. Allowing jurors to ask questions
benefits both the defendant and the jurors. The practice helps
jurors perform their role as fact-finders and allows them to make
better judgments.
While some states and judges have recognized the benefits and
implemented juror questioning, many courts discourage or forbid
the practice. However, despite this division, there has become an
emerging trend towards allowing questioning, as well as many other
trial innovations.
Only four states refuse to permit juror
questioning and no federal circuit court has prohibited the
practice, thus it is possible that an increasing number of judges will
realize the benefits and allow the reform in their courts. With
Arizona serving as an example, juror questioning may be a jury
reform that blossoms even further in the near future.
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